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INTERNATIONAL DECISIONS
EDITED BY DAVID P. STEWART
International criminal law—Rome Statute—command responsibility—crimes against humanity—war
crimes—rape—pillage—evidence
PROSECUTOR v. BEMBA. Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute.
At https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_02238.PDF.
International Criminal Court, March 21, 2016.
On March 21, 2016, Trial Chamber III of the International Criminal Court (ICC or Court)
issued the fourth judgment in the Court’s fourteen-year lifetime, convicting Jean-Pierre
Bemba Gombo of three counts of war crimes (murder, rape, and pillage) and two counts of
crimes against humanity (murder and rape).1 The judgment clarifies the precise scope of the
responsibility of commanders for the acts of their subordinates under Article 28 of the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court,2 and encompasses a range of notable findings on
sexual violence and pillage in times of armed conflict. The judgment is also likely to be instru-
mental in deciding on evidentiary issues that will arise in future cases before the ICC and other
international courts, as well as national courts trying international crimes.
Bemba, a national of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), was serving as a mem-
ber of the Senate of that country when he was arrested in 2008. In 1998, he had founded the
Mouvement de libe´ration du Congo (MLC), a rebel group aimed at overthrowing the Kinshasa
government that subsequently became an established political party in the DRC. At the time
relevant to the charges, Bemba was both president of the MLC political party and commander
in chief of its military wing, the Arme´e de libe´ration du Congo (para. 1). In 2002, in response
to a request from President Ange-Fe´lix Patasse´ of the Central African Republic (CAR), Bemba
had deployed Liberation Army members from the DRC to the CAR to assist troops supporting
Patasse´ in his fight against a coup d’e´tat (paras. 379–80).
The situation in the CAR was referred to the ICC in 2004 by its new government, which
asked the Office of the Prosecutor to investigate alleged crimes committed on the territory of
the state during 2002 and 2003.3 The prosecutor launched a full investigation in 2007. After
his arrest in Belgium in July 2008, Bemba was charged with crimes against humanity and war
crimes as a perpetrator, pursuant to Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute. At the hearing on
1 Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08-3343, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute (Mar.
21, 2016), at https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_02238.PDF [hereinafter Judgment]. Decisions and
documents of the Court cited herein are available online at its website, http://www.icc-cpi.int.
2 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 UNTS 3 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
3 Situation in the Central African Republic, Case No. ICC-01/05-1, Decision Assigning the Situation in the
Central African Republic to Pre-trial Chamber III ( Jan. 19, 2005), at https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR
2007_03762.PDF.
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confirmation of the charges in March 2009, the pretrial chamber asked the prosecutor to con-
sider whether command responsibility under Article 28 might be a more suitable mode of lia-
bility (paras. 5–6). In June 2009, the pretrial chamber confirmed the availability of sufficient
evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that Bemba was responsible, as a person
effectively acting as a military commander, for the crimes against humanity of rape and murder
and the war crimes of murder, rape, and pillage allegedly committed by MLC troops on the
territory of the CAR between October 2002 and March 2003.4 The trial began in November
2010 (paras. 7–10).
Article 28 establishes liability of military commanders, or other superiors exercising effective
authority and control, for the crimes committed by their subordinates where they knew or
should have known of those crimes and failed to prevent or repress them. The chamber under-
stood the term “repress” as encompassing a duty to punish the perpetrators (paras. 205–06).
To prove criminal responsibility under Article 28, the chamber needed to be satisfied beyond
reasonable doubt of five elements: first, that Bemba had acted in effect as military commander;
second, that forces under his effective command and control had committed crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court; third, that there was a causal link between his failure to act and the
commission of those crimes; fourth, that he knew or had reason to know that the subordinates
were committing or about to commit those crimes; and last, that he had failed to take all nec-
essary and reasonable measures within his power to prevent or impose punishment for those
crimes. The chamber found that command responsibility under Article 28 represented a sui
generis mode of liability (paras. 170–74).
As this was the first judgment issued by the ICC under Article 28, the chamber had the
opportunity to expound on each of the elements of this mode of liability. Turning first to
the establishment of the status of the accused as effectively acting as military commander,
the chamber noted that such status is not predicated on his having carried out exclusively
military functions. The imposition of criminal responsibility applies at every level of the
chain of command; it is strictly limited neither to the perpetrators’ immediate superiors,
nor to the highest-level leaders of the command (paras. 177–79).
Intrinsically linked to the status of the accused as effectively acting as military commander
is the second element, whether he exercised either effective command and control or effective
authority and control over the subordinates who committed the crimes. The chamber distin-
guished the closely related concepts of “authority” and “command,” referring to the former as
the power to give orders and enforce obedience, and to the latter as authority, particularly over
armed forces. Nevertheless, it emphasized that whether an accused’s power was best classified
as “command” or “authority” did not bear substantially on meeting the threshold established
in Article 28, but rather illustrated how control over subordinates was exercised (paras. 180–
81).5 Factors indicating such control include the power to issue orders, the capacity to ensure
compliance with orders, the ability to re-subordinate units or change the command structure,
control over finances, the capacity to move troops from one area to another, the capacity to
enter into external negotiations on behalf of the group, and the ability to promote or demote
4 Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08-424, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the
Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor ( June 15, 2009), at https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR
2009_04528.PDF [hereinafter Confirmation of the Charges] (reported by Johan D. van der Vyer at 104 AJIL 241
(2010)).
5 Citing Confirmation of the Charges, supra note 4, paras. 412–13.
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individuals. There is no need to show that the commander exercised control to the exclusion
of all others, but if another enjoyed exclusive authority, the requisite level of control may well
be missing (paras. 185, 188–90).
In establishing that MLC troops under Bemba’s control had committed crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court, witnesses’ testimonies that the perpetrators spoke the Lingala lan-
guage, wore particular types of uniform, and were present in certain areas exclusively con-
trolled by MLC forces were crucial (paras. 626 –28, 638, 642). Whereas one of these ele-
ments, taken alone, may not have sufficed to identify the perpetrators, the cumulative
effect of the evidence satisfied the chamber beyond reasonable doubt that the troops were
MLC forces (paras. 240 – 44).
Article 28 establishes a causal link between the crimes and the commander’s failure to exer-
cise control, by stating that the commander will be responsible for crimes committed by forces
under his or her control “as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such
forces.”6 The chamber found that this link would be proven “when it is established that the
crimes would not have been committed . . . had the commander exercised control properly”
(para. 213). Judge Ozaki, noting different possible readings from the six official translations
of the Rome Statute, agreed with this interpretation, linking it to the key principle of criminal
law that there must be a personal link to the crime for liability to attach.7
Judge Steiner, in her separate opinion, noted that the nexus between the commission of the
crimes and the commander’s failure to exercise control properly applies, regardless of whether
the superior is alleged to have failed to prevent or punish, or to submit the matter to the relevant
authorities. But she also appeared to suggest that the nexus is to the commission of the crimes
for an alleged failure to prevent, and to criminal liability in cases of an alleged failure to punish
or submit the matter to competent authorities. To this end, Judge Steiner noted that “the cau-
sality requirement between the failure of the general duty to exercise control properly and the
crimes still persists in circumstances where the attribution of liability rests solely on the com-
mander’s failure to repress the crimes—when understood as ‘punish’—or to submit the matter
to the competent authorities.”8
Judge Ozaki’s separate opinion on this point, by contrast, argued that the commander’s duty
to exert control properly should be read more holistically, and that the duties of effective super-
vision and discipline are part of the ongoing functions of effective command and control. That
is, the duties to prevent or suppress the crimes, or submit their commission or its possibility
to the relevant authorities for investigation, do not simply apply once the commander is aware
that subordinates have engaged or are about to engage in such activities. Instead, “the duty to
exercise control properly—including, as appropriate, to put effective systems of supervision
and discipline in place—to which the nexus requirement attaches, is operative before the point
in time when the forces are committing or about to commit the crimes.”9
6 Rome Statute, supra note 2, Art. 28(a), (b).
7 Judgment, Separate Opinion of Judge Kuniko Ozaki, ICC-01/05-01/08-3343-AnxII, paras. 9, 11[hereinafter
Ozaki, J., sep. op.], at http://www.icc-cpi.int (search for “ICC-01/05-01/08-3343,” then follow hyperlink to Judg-
ment) [hereinafter Links Page].
8 Judgment, Separate Opinion of Judge Sylvia Steiner, ICC-01/05-01/08-3343-AnxI, para. 14 (emphasis
added), at Links Page, supra note 7.
9 Ozaki, J., sep. op., supra note 7, para. 17.
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The next element to be proven in command responsibility cases is whether the commander
knew or had reason to know of the crimes of his or her subordinates. In September 2012, the
chamber issued a notification under Regulation 55 of the ICC Regulations of the Court,10
notifying the parties that it might consider the alternate form of “knowledge” under Article 28
of the Statute—whether Bemba “had reason to know,” as opposed to actually “knew,” of the
alleged crimes of his subordinates (para. 11). Ultimately, however, the chamber concluded that
Bemba had had actual knowledge of the crimes committed by MLC forces, and thus rechar-
acterization under Regulation 55 was unnecessary. It based this determination on such factors
as Bemba’s position; the channels of communication and regular contact between Bemba and
officials in the CAR; and intelligence reports by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the
media, and the MLC (para. 717). Therefore, the legal characterization of the charges did not
need to be amended so as to examine whether the accused “should have known” of these crimes.
The inference of knowledge from NGO reports and Bemba’s response to them is notable.
In 2003, the International Federation for Human Rights issued a report based on its investi-
gations in the CAR, where it highlighted that MLC troops had been committing the crimes
of rape, pillage, and murder. Bemba initially responded to the report in the local press by accus-
ing the federation of making political allegations, but he later wrote to its president assuring
him that prosecutions would take place. The president responded by noting the prosecutions
of low-ranking Liberation Army soldiers for pillage but expressed some concerns about the
scope and legitimacy of those proceedings. He further encouraged Bemba to cooperate
fully with the ICC, and to transfer any information at his disposal to the Court (paras.
607–11). From this evidence, the chamber was able to infer that Bemba did know of the
alleged crimes of his subordinates and, despite being told of the insufficiency of his
response, refused to carry out more effective measures to punish those crimes or cooperate
with the competent authorities.
The chamber examined Article 28’s requirement that the commander must have failed “to
take all necessary measures” to prevent or repress the commission of the crimes, or to submit
their commission to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution. It found that
failure to discharge any of these three duties could result in criminal liability and, following the
jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia on this
point,11 noted that the failure to prevent the crimes, when the commander was in a position
to do so, could not be remedied by the subsequent punishment of the subordinates (paras. 197–
209). Various measures that responsible commanders could take included ensuring the pro-
vision of adequate training in international humanitarian law, taking disciplinary measures,
issuing orders prohibiting the commission of crimes, postponing military operations, suspend-
ing or redeploying violent subordinates, and insisting to a superior authority that immediate
action should be taken (paras. 203–04).
To this end, and others, the chamber found that Bemba himself could have withdrawn MLC
troops from the CAR; commenced genuine investigations into the commission of crimes;
issued orders to commanders in the CAR to prevent the commission of crimes; ensured that
10 Regulations of the Court, May 26, 2004, as amended, ICC-BD/01-03-11 (Nov. 2, 2011).
11 Prosecutor v. Blasˇkic´, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeals Judgment, para. 83 ( July 29, 2004); Prosecutor v. Oric´,
Case No. IT-03-68-T, para. 326 ( June 30, 2006). These cases and those cited infra at notes 13–14 are available
at http://www.icty.org.
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troops received adequate payment and rations to prevent them from resorting to “self-com-
pensation” through pillage and rape; ensured that troops be properly trained in international
humanitarian law; removed, replaced, or dismissed soldiers known to have committed crimes;
and shared information with prosecuting authorities and supported the investigation of crim-
inal allegations (paras. 729–33, 739). Instead, the steps initiated by Bemba—the issuance of
generalized, public warnings to troops to respect civilians; the trial of seven low-ranking sol-
diers on charges of pillage; and the creation of two investigative commissions, which were lim-
ited to allegations of pillage over a limited temporal and geographic scope, and a mission of
inquiry, which interviewed only a small number of persons (with armed MLC guards present
during the interviews)—did not constitute sufficient evidence that he had taken all measures
within his power as required under Article 28. He was found to have made no effort to inves-
tigate or prosecute matters himself, to refer cases to the competent national authorities, or to
cooperate with the international efforts to investigate the crimes (paras. 719–20, 733).
As regards sexual violence, the judgment recounts horrific accounts of the rape of girls as
young as ten years old (para. 516), male rape (paras. 494, 498), and gang rape (paras. 465, 491,
548, 551). The chamber clarified that a victim’s lack of consent does not need to be proven
beyond reasonable doubt; where force, threat of force or coercion, or taking advantage of a
coercive environment can be proven, the prosecution does not need to establish the victim’s
lack of consent (paras. 105–06).
The chamber observed that lack of consent by property owners is a necessary element of the
war crime of pillage. It found that pillage requires the large-scale appropriation of property and,
given that Article 8(2)(e)(v) of the Rome Statute refers to the pillaging of “a town or place,”
the “pillaging of a single house would not suffice” (para. 117). Article 8(2)(e)(v) includes a
unique requirement that the property must have been appropriated for “private or personal
use” (para. 118). The chamber found that, owing to the disjunctive wording (“private or per-
sonal use”), this element does not require that the perpetrator personally intended to use the
pillaged items. Where the prosecution can show that property was appropriated for private or
personal use, it is not obliged to disprove that the appropriation of property could be justified
by military necessity (paras. 120, 124).
Bemba was sentenced to eighteen years’ imprisonment in June 2016.12
* * * *
The Bemba judgment marks a turning point in the ICC’s history, as the first conviction of
a military commander for the crimes of his subordinates. As such, the judgment offers some
welcome clarification of outstanding issues on this mode of liability. First, it confirms that com-
mand responsibility represents a sui generis mode of liability, by which commanders are found
to be criminally responsible for the acts of their subordinates. Considerable debate had arisen
as to whether command responsibility imposes criminal liability on superiors for failing to pre-
vent or exact punishment for the crimes of their subordinates, or whether that failure renders
superiors responsible for the crimes committed by their subordinates.13 Importantly, the
chamber confirmed that the latter is the proper interpretation of the nature of command
12 Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08-3399, Decision on Sentence Pursuant to Article 76 of the
Statute ( June 21, 2016), at https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_04476.PDF.
13 Prosecutor v. Halilovic´, Case No. IT-01-48-T, paras. 42–54 (Nov. 16, 2005).
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responsibility, finding support for this position in the wording of Article 28, which states that
liability under that provision is “[i]n addition to other grounds of criminal responsibility under
this Statute” and that superiors “shall be criminally responsible for crimes” committed by their
subordinates (para. 173).
Second, it confirms that command responsibility can attach to any person exercising effec-
tive control over subordinates, wherever their place in the chain of command (para. 179). Last,
it establishes the precise nature of the causal link required under Article 28, clarifying that the
failure in command must be linked to the commission of the crimes (paras. 210–13). This
causal element is unique in the ICC’s statutory framework; other international criminal tri-
bunals have not found a requirement of causation for superior responsibility.14 It has been
debated whether this causal element attaches to the criminal responsibility of the commander
or to the commission of the crime—whether the term “as a result of” relates to the command-
er’s being criminally responsible as a result of his or her failure to exercise adequate control,15
or whether command responsibility attaches where crimes have been committed as a result of
the commander’s omission.16 The chamber confirmed that the latter interpretation is correct,
and it applied a “but for” standard in finding that liability will attach “when it is established
that the crimes would not have been committed . . . had the commander exercised control
properly” (para. 213). This threshold is higher than that set out in the decision on confirmation
of the charges, which required only that the commander’s omission “increased the risk of the
commission of the crimes charged.”17 The chamber noted that a “but for” standard was not
required under the Rome Statute but deemed it desirable for the purposes of consistent and
objective application (paras. 212–13).
Although this causal link may be obvious in case of failure to prevent the crimes committed,
it is less clear if the commander allegedly failed to impose punishment for (or “repress,” in the
words of Article 28) those crimes that have already taken place, or to submit their commission
to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution. The judgment rather sidesteps
this difficult issue. Still, some illustration of how the causal element might arise from failure
to punish can be found in the concluding pages of the judgment, which refer to a “climate of
acquiescence” created when Bemba, inter alia, failed to refer the crimes to the appropriate
authorities (para. 738). Relatedly, Judge Ozaki’s holistic view of the commander’s role, which
incorporates having systems in place to punish wrongdoing effectively, establishes that the
commander’s duties to both prevent and exact punishment for the crimes of subordinates
should not be viewed as wholly distinct from each other.
Significantly, Bemba spent much of the period relevant to the charges in a different
country than the MLC troops; while they were stationed in the CAR, he remained in the
DRC. The judgment emphasizes, however, that commanders cannot claim ignorance of
the acts of their subordinates, and that the duty to ensure compliance with international
14 Prosecutor v. Delalic´, Case No. IT-96-21-T, paras. 396-400 (Nov. 16, 1998).
15 See Amnesty International, Amicus Curiae Observations on Superior Responsibility Submitted Pursuant
to Rule 103 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ICC-01/05-01/08-406 (Apr. 20, 2009), at https://
www.icc-cpi.int/pages/record.aspx?uri669669 (making this argument).
16 See GUE´NAE¨L METTRAUX, THE LAW OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY 33, 82–89 (2009).
17 Confirmation of the Charges, supra note 4, para. 425.
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humanitarian law18 remains, even when commanders are geographically distant from their
troops. The judgment usefully illustrates the kinds of measures that are expected of respon-
sible commanders in preventing their subordinates from committing crimes, in addressing
situations where crimes have been committed by subordinates, and in seeking effective
punishment for those crimes.
The findings on rape are particularly noteworthy and again represent a first for the ICC,
insofar as this is the Court’s first conviction for crimes of sexual violence. The ICC was
criticized in its early years for the prosecutor’s failure to charge individuals with rape and
other forms of sexual violence, where clear evidence suggested that those crimes had been
committed.19 The judgment not only sensitively and completely outlines the suffering
inflicted on the victims who testified before the chamber, but also acknowledges the long-
term effects of these crimes, including HIV, post-traumatic stress disorder, ongoing med-
ical issues, depression, and isolation caused by the resulting stigma. Notably, the Court
acknowledges the gender-neutral language of its Statute and enters a conviction of rape
committed against male victims as rape, and not as torture, cruel or inhuman treatment,
or outrages upon personal dignity, as was typically charged before other international
criminal tribunals.20
The chamber’s findings on pillage expand on the more controversial aspects of Article
8(2)(e)(v) of the Rome Statute, such as the requirements that the pillage be of a town or place
and for private or personal use, elements that are largely accepted as not being required under
customary international law. The finding that an absence of military necessity is not required
for the crime of pillage appears to run contrary to the principle of in dubio pro reo established
in Article 22(2) of the Statute: where there is any ambiguity on the definition of a crime, the
interpretation that favors the accused should be adopted. The defense supported its asser-
tion that an absence of military necessity was required with reference to footnote 61 of the
Elements of Crimes, which states that “[a]s indicated by the use of the term ‘private or
personal use’, appropriations justified by military necessity cannot constitute the crime of
pillaging.”21 That statement seems to suggest that appropriations justified by military
necessity (for example, the appropriation of food to sustain hungry soldiers) could not con-
stitute pillage. Nevertheless, the chamber found that there was no need to prove the
absence of military necessity.
Last, the reliance on the report of the International Federation for Human Rights and
the response of Bemba in establishing his knowledge of the crimes highlights a clear role
for civil society. NGOs and other organizations working in regions where atrocities are
committed would be well-advised, following this judgment, to continue to document
18 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims
of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Art. 87(2), June 8, 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 (establishing this duty,
among other instruments).
19 See Diane Marie Amann, Case Report: Prosecutor v. Lubanga, 106 AJIL 809, 812 (2012).
20 See further Sandesh Sivakumaran, Sexual Violence Against Men in Armed Conflict, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 253
(2007); Niamh Hayes, The Bemba Trial Judgement—A Memorable Day for the Prosecution of Sexual Violence
by the ICC, PHD STUDIES IN HUMAN RIGHTS (Mar. 21, 2016, 6:32 PM GMT), at http://humanrights
doctorate.blogspot.com.
21 Elements of Crimes, Art. 8(2)(e)(v), para. 2 n.61, ASSEMBLY OF STATES PARTIES TO THE ROME STATUTE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, OFFICIAL RECORDS, FIRST SESSION, at 150, UN Doc. ICC-ASP/
1/3 & Corr.1, UN Sales No. E.03.V2 (2002).
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crimes in detail, and to put their allegations to the respective political and military leaders
who have the power to stop those crimes and/or refer them to prosecuting authorities.
Even if those leaders claim that they will take action to hold the individual perpetrators
to account but fail to do so, this judgment stresses that they cannot later claim ignorance
of the scope of their subordinates’ crimes. To this end, the judgment heralds a new frame-
work for concerted action between activism and prosecution in the fight against
impunity.
YVONNE MCDERMOTT
Bangor University, United Kingdom
Caribbean Community—Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas—freedom of movement under Community law—
indirect and direct effect of international law—LGBT rights
TOMLINSON v. BELIZE; TOMLINSON v. TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO. [2016] CCJ 1 (OJ). At http://
www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org.
Caribbean Court of Justice, June 10, 2016.
On June 10, 2016, the Caribbean Court of Justice (Court or CCJ) rejected a claim that the
Immigration Acts of Belize and Trinidad and Tobago, both of which contain express provi-
sions banning the entry of homosexuals into those two countries, violate the right to free move-
ment of individuals within the Caribbean Community (CARICOM or Community).1 Absent
any evidence that those laws had in fact been applied to exclude CARICOM nationals from
entering their own countries on the basis of their sexual orientation, the Court declined to find
a violation of Community law. At the same time, the Court ruled that CARICOM law requires
member states to admit homosexuals from other CARICOM states, and that Belize and Trin-
idad and Tobago may therefore not indefinitely retain legislation that appears to conflict with
their obligations under Community law. The decision endorses the principle of nondiscrim-
ination on the basis of sexual orientation, recognizes the principle of free movement within
CARICOM, and clarifies the principle of direct applicability of Community law in the legal
systems of CARICOM member states.
The free movement of individuals within CARICOM is regulated by the Revised Treaty of
Chaguaramas (RTC).2 Article 7 of that treaty prohibits discrimination on the grounds
of nationality; Article 45 establishes that member states must commit themselves to the goal
of free movement of their nationals within the Community; and Article 46 requires member
states to allow skilled Community nationals to enter other CARICOM member states to seek
employment. These obligations are supplemented by the 2007 decision of the Conference of
the Heads of Government of CARICOM (2007 decision), which confers upon all CARICOM
1 Tomlinson v. Belize; Tomlinson v. Trinidad and Tobago, [2016] CCJ 1 (Original Jurisdiction) (Caribbean Ct.
Justice June 10, 2016). The Court’s opinions cited herein are available at http://www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org.
2 CARICOM, the Caribbean Community, was created in 1973 by the Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Com-
munity and its annex, The Caribbean Common Market, July 4, 1973, 946 UNTS 17, known as the Treaty of Cha-
guaramas. That treaty was replaced in 2001 by the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas Establishing the Caribbean
Community Including the CARICOM Single Market and Economy, July 5, 2001, 2259 UNTS 293. Both treaties
are available at http://www.caricom.org.
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